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Abstract 
This article examines social attitudes towards social rights in Portugal. It utilizes original 
survey data from 2013 to study the distribution of welfare attitudes in a context of economic 
austerity and welfare retrenchment. The main argument is that there are at least two sources 
of preference-formation regarding public social provision: one is universalistic (or needs-
based), the other is contributory. These two logics frame choices concerning the future of the 
welfare state in Portugal. We explore the determinants of this choice through three 
hypotheses: dualization between insiders and outsiders (H1); the type of welfare regime (H2), 
and social rights consciousness (H3). Our findings suggest that choice between universalistic 
and contributory models is not impervious to macro-institutional factors and labour market 
performance. The paper’s main contribution, however, is to empirically demonstrate that this 
choice is significantly shaped by pre-existing understandings of social rights in Portugal, 
namely its politically contested character.  
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1. Introduction 
In times of austerity, welfare states are often called into question. The current era of austerity 
in Europe is no exception. Especially since 2009, there has been a heated debate involving 
governments, policy-makers, and the public at large on the future of the welfare state in 
Europe. Political debate and decision-making benefit from detailed and up-dated knowledge 
concerning people’s preferences. Hence the main question of this paper: What are people’s 
welfare preferences in a context of economic crisis and austerity? This question is important 
for at least two reasons. First, income redistribution by the government is a central feature of 
all industrialized countries. Over the course of the twentieth century, and particularly since 
the Second World War, political and economic modernization entailed a dramatic expansion 
of public social welfare programmes, that is, the fundamental instrument of income 
redistribution by the government alongside fiscal policies. Second, political conflicts over 
redistribution, already one of the most contested issues in democracies, tend to become more 
acute in times of austerity. In crisis-ridden Europe, most political debates, at the national and 
supra-national levels, revolve around income redistribution trade-offs. This is especially the 
case in southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal, where such trade-offs have 
become all the more obvious as austerity policies imposed by international lenders made 
social expenditure a preferred target, including pension reforms, unemployment subsidies, 
and health care benefits. Moreover, there is mounting evidence that the general public’s 
preferences regarding welfare provision seem amenable to change in difficult times (e.g. 
Ervasti et al. 2012; Fridberg 2012). Experiencing the worst economic crisis in a generation 
while being forced by international lenders to implement unprecedented welfare retrenchment 
programmes, Greece and Portugal provide excellent case studies with which to study 
evolving attitudes towards welfare.  
This paper focuses upon Portugal, which requested international financial assistance 
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in April 2011 from a troika of organizations including the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Portugal provides an ideal case 
study for testing the resilience of universalistic understandings of welfare provision. This 
paper offers an analysis of the distribution of social attitudes towards the welfare state in 
Portugal, two years into the implementation of the austerity programme imposed by 
international lenders. The democratic Portuguese welfare state was erected according to 
strictly universalistic terms and it has never been seriously contested by neoliberal ideas. The 
troika’s intervention marks the first attempt to restructure the Portuguese welfare state 
according to non-universalistic principles.  
Portugal inaugurated the third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century 
with the Carnations Revolution of April 25, 1974 (Huntington 1991). The new democracy 
defined itself in terms of a break with the Estado Novo, a corporativist dictatorship created in 
1933, and oriented towards European social democratic and socialist models. This is 
particularly obvious as regards public social provision. The Portuguese Constitution of 1975 
contains what is still the longest and most detailed section on social rights in the world (Ben-
Bassat and Dahan 2008), with a strong emphasis upon principles of generality, gratuity, 
decentralization, and universalism. Social rights were no longer to be conceived as 
prerogatives of certain occupational groups, but as citizenship entitlements to be enjoyed by 
all citizens. These constitutional promises had institutional implications. The democratic 
welfare state was implemented in broadly universalistic terms, with universal public systems 
in the domains of health care, social security, and education (Vieira and Silva 2010; 2013). 
As in other southern European countries, however, such universalistic promises conflict with 
the high degree of fragmentation, familialism, and persistent gaps in social provision that 
characterize the Portuguese welfare state (Ferrera 1996, 1997; Mingione 2001; Rhodes 1997; 
Trifiletti 1999; Karamessini 2008). The Portuguese welfare state can thus be described as 
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belonging to a southern European sub-type of the Continental state-corporatist model, in 
which universalistic elements predominate despite the persistence of clientelist and 
corporatist elements leading to fragmentation (Guibentif 1996; see also Leibfried 1993 on a 
Latin-Rim welfare model). The existing survey-based literature on Portuguese welfare 
attitudes lends support to this description (Cabral 1997). Briefly, this is the background 
against which the first attempt at the systematic restructuring of the Portuguese welfare state 
along non-universalist principles, embodied in the May 2011 Memorandum of Understanding 
on Specific Economic Conditionality between the Portuguese government and the troika of 
international lenders, was signed.  
This study utilizes individual-level data from a survey applied to a representative 
sample of the Portuguese adult population in the spring of 2013 to explore attitudes in a 
context of welfare cuts resulting from the troika’s intervention. The dependent variable is the 
opinion on which social rights should be universally guaranteed in a context of austerity. The 
main argument is that there are at least two sources of preference-formation regarding public 
social provision. According to the first logic, if one considers that social rights are inherent in 
human nature and core components of citizenship, one would favour a universalistic view in 
which everybody deserves access to social rights, irrespective of the level of individual 
contribution. In broad terms, this is the understanding enshrined in the Portuguese 
Constitution, consistently upheld by the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence since 1982, and 
which inspired the establishment of a universalistic social protection system, including a 
National Health Service primarily financed by taxation. According to the second logic, if one 
is aware that social rights imply obligations, one may favour a targeted view in which the 
enjoyment of social rights is based upon the extent of one’s individual contribution and need. 
This logic inspired the old dictatorial regime’s social provision schemes, defined largely in 
corporatist terms, which, albeit with important differences, can also be found in the troika’s 
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policy preferences. In this paper, we explore both logics to explain individual-level support 
for the public provision of education, health care, social security, and housing in a context 
marked by fiscal austerity and the (historically unprecedented) political questioning of the 
universalist character of public social provision.  
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses and positions 
them amid the literature of welfare preferences: the dualization hypothesis (H1), the regime 
hypothesis (H2), and the social rights consciousness hypothesis (H3). In section 3, we discuss 
the data collection and the selection of variables, and present the regression models mobilized 
to test the hypotheses. In section 4, we examine the results of the regression analyses and 
discuss these findings by reference to the literature. We conclude with an overview of our 
findings and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
The first hypothesis takes its inspiration from recent literature on the ‘dualization’ of 
advanced post-industrial societies (Häusermann and Schwander 2010; Rueda 2005), which 
suggests western populations are increasingly divided into two groups with contrasting job 
market performances. On the one hand, we have the ‘outsiders’, which include those 
unemployed or with an unstable employment record. On the other hand, there are the 
‘insiders’, who typically enjoy stable employment and have relatively long contributory 
careers. Inspired by zero-sum games, this hypothesis holds that both insiders and outsiders 
favour income redistribution by the government in times of austerity, but for different reasons 
and with different objectives in mind. This means that authorities have to choose different, 
indeed opposing, policy mixes to satisfy the demands of these two increasingly separate 
sectors of society.  
 By stipulating that the labour market cleavage coalesces into stable yet contrasting 
sets of interests and preferences, thus consolidates the aforementioned trend towards societal 
dualization, this hypothesis builds upon a materialist conception of human agency primarily 
motivated by self-interest. Self-interest has long been found to be a major determinant of 
welfare attitudes (Baslevent and Kirmanoglu 2011; Reeskens and van Oorschot 2013). Some 
studies have lent empirical support to the idea that dualization is primarily driven by 
motivations of self-interest. Blekesaune, for instance, has found that self-interest motivates 
social groups which are, or are likely to become, recipients of welfare state programmes, to 
adopt more positive attitudes towards these policies than those less likely to receive them 
(2007: 394). This has led dualization scholars to hypothesize that it is primarily for reasons of 
self-interest that outsiders ‘prefer policies that allocate resources based on need, rather than 
contribution-payments’, while insiders favour: ‘policies that reward their – more continuous 
and stable – labour market performance’ (Häusermann and Schwander 2010: 3). Portugal 
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seems to be a suitable case to test the robustness of this conjecture. This is for two reasons. 
First, the combination of a highly fragmented social protection system and a dual labour 
market has been seen in the last couple of decades to lead to increasing ‘dualization’ between 
well-protected beneficiaries and a growing number of unprotected individuals (Moreno 
2006). Second, the circumstance that the austerity programme associated with the 2011 bail-
out led to both a net reduction of available income for pensioners (a typical insider’s 
concern), and to record high unemployment rates (a typical outsider’s issue), may have 
reinforced the trend towards the dualization of Portuguese society and fuelled dichotomous 
public support for welfare policies. Hence our first hypothesis (H1): when asked which social 
rights should the government guarantee even in hard times, the insiders’ choice is expected 
to favour contribution-based welfare models (e.g. pensions of reform), while outsiders are 
expected to favour need-based welfare models (e.g. unemployment benefits). 
Second, the ‘regime’ hypothesis suggests that welfare state types filter the effect of 
austerity on attitudes (e.g. Ebbinghaus 2012). Institutionalists draw upon the general 
hypothesized relationship between welfare regimes and support for redistribution (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999). According to this literature, the relative level of public support for 
redistribution in Portugal’s southern European state-corporatist model is expected to be 
somewhere between the highly redistributive Social Democratic regime and the residual 
Liberal regime type (e.g. Arts and Gelissen 2001; Trifiletti 1999). The existing empirical 
literature, however, has had difficulty verifying how welfare attitudes consistently differ 
across countries (Jaeger 2006). This seems to be less of a problem in certain single-case 
studies where welfare attitudes have been found to broadly agree with the respective welfare 
type. For instance, available data on Portuguese social attitudes dating back to the 1990s 
shows, alongside support for complementary, contributory schemes, even more significant 
popular support for universalistic welfare provision (Cabral 1997, 2000). In sum, there are 
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strong reasons, both attitudinal and historical-institutional, for one to expect the majority of 
the Portuguese population to prefer a universal welfare state. Our second hypothesis (H2) is 
thus that respondents are generally more likely to choose the universalistic, all-rights option 
than any of the other more contributory understandings.  
Third, there is the ‘social rights consciousness’ hypothesis according to which the 
consciousness of social rights mediates structural events, such as the eventuality of austerity, 
and social attitudes towards welfare policies and principles (for an overview, see Hertogh 
2004). This hypothesis is partly driven by two circumstances. First, besides prompting 
institutional and legal reform, the current crisis has led to a noticeable increase in the 
frequency of debates over welfare reform in the Portuguese media. Never has the Portuguese 
population been exposed to such detailed and heated debate on welfare reform and 
retrenchment as it has since the 2011 bail-out and subsequent austerity policies, including 
dozens of books, newspapers reports and editorials, television specials, as well as numerous 
academic seminars, conferences, and workshops. Second, the recent rise in protest activities 
in Portugal in response to austerity measures and welfare cuts (Baumgarten 2013) is likely to 
have contributed to an increase in Portuguese awareness of what social rights mean and what 
welfare provision implies, i.e. ‘social rights consciousness’. Social rights consciousness has 
been recently defined as: ‘the ways in which people act towards and think about rights’ (Silva 
2013: 11). As a sub-set of legal consciousness, ‘social rights consciousness’ is not a mere 
preference for rights (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Rather, it refers to a multidimensional 
understanding of rights as relational, reflexive, and contested. To have a right is to enter a 
political relation, to belong to a community whose norms include that right as something 
anybody can assert and that everybody can recognize. Rights require every member of the 
political community to take both roles or positions involved in a rights relation, that of 
entitlement and that of the obligation to respect it – this is how rights help constitute 
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individual political identities. Rights are contested not only within oneself (i.e., one’s legal 
consciousness is a dialectical process, responsive to concrete action-problems in real world 
situations, which evolves over time potentially in contradictory ways), but between different 
selves (politicians, judges, and ordinary citizens, for example, often disagree about the 
interpretation and application of rights). This pragmatic understanding of rights, whereby 
rights refer to doing more than having, can be traced back to the work of the early twentieth 
century American social psychologist G.H. Mead (2011: 211-322). We operationalize this 
concept through indicators measuring each of its three components. Our survey includes a 
block of original questions tackling the various trade-offs associated with social rights 
(relational), the frequency with which one thinks about and discusses them (reflexive), and 
their genealogy (contested). Given the revolutionary, left-of-centre historical origins of the 
democratic welfare state in Portugal, the third hypothesis (H3) is that the more prevalent 
social rights consciousness is, the more likely respondents are to follow a universalistic logic 
of preference-formation. This differs from the dualization and type of regime hypotheses 
above insofar as it does not suppose congruence between socio-economic attributes or macro-
institutional solutions and social attitudes. Rather, it determines that those social rights which 
are to be guaranteed by the government even in hard times are understood to stem from the 
respondent’s practical knowledge. As far as we know, this is one of the few attempts to 
incorporate legal consciousness into the study of welfare attitudes in Europe, and is certainly 
the first to apply it to the study of welfare attitudes in Portugal. 
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3. Data and Methods  
Our data emerges from an original and nationally representative survey of the Portuguese 
population on citizen rights and obligations, governmental responsibility towards welfare and 
social provision, and welfare arrangements. The survey replicates some parts of the 2008 
module on welfare attitudes of the Fourth Round of the European Social Survey (ESS), to 
which it adds blocks of questions from pre-existing surveys (International Social Survey 
Programme 2004), as well as new ones (e.g. questions on ‘social rights consciousness’). As 
far as we know, this is the first time that part of the 2008 ESS module on welfare attitudes has 
been replicated at the country level. The questionnaire has 62 closed questions. The sample 
comprises 1,258 adults and fieldwork took place in the spring of 2013. The sample has been 
nationally and regionally weighted to represent the country’s five main regions (North, 
Centre, Lisbon, Alentejo, and the Algarve). Respondents were interviewed according to 
random selection in each region, following quotas for gender, age, level of education, and 
occupation. A survey company especially hired and trained conducted face-to-face interviews 
at respondents’ homes. The pre-test, comprising 15 interviews in Lisbon and Porto, was 
carried out in March 2013. Fieldwork took place between 8 and 30 April 2013.3 Descriptive 
statistics of the sample are summarized in Table 1.  
 [Table 1 here] 
 
3.1 Variables 
The dependent variables are about which social rights people believe should be protected 
from welfare retrenchment. We derive them from the following survey question: ‘If the 
government had to reduce social spending, which of the following rights do you consider 
                                                          
3 A copy of the questionnaire is available from the authors upon request. 
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should be guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their level of income: social security, 
education, health, housing’. Respondents were asked to choose none, one, two, three, or all 
four rights in the list. We believe that, given the situation of austerity fatigue in Portugal at 
the time when the survey was deployed, if we were to ask people directly ‘what rights to cut’ 
this would elicit biased responses by prompting people to assume that rights had to be cut. To 
avoid this bias, we phrased the question in positive terms. It is assumed that choosing all four 
rights or three rights points to a universalistic understanding of the welfare state. That is, 
respondents are thought to subscribe to a general, overarching state responsibility for social 
provision. Conversely, we take all other answers (none, one, or two rights) to reflect a 
contributory understanding of public social provision, with certain social risks or 
vulnerabilities given priority over others.  
 The independent variables include reported political participation, ideology, social 
rights consciousness, and socio-economic controls. The independent variables are aligned 
with the hypotheses and with findings in previous studies, which have found them to be 
significant determinants of social attitudes concerning the role of government in social 
provision (Algan, Cahuc, and Sangnier 2011; Foster and Kaminska 2012; Roosma, Gelissen, 
and van Oorschot 2013; Schwander and Häusermann 2013), in redistribution (Jaeger 2009; 
León 2012; Stegmueller et al 2012), in government measures to promote equality, security, 
and opportunity (Taylor-Gooby 2011).  
 Political participation and ideology is studied by means of the following variables: 
Whether the respondent has either contacted a politician, worked in a party, signed a petition, 
participated in a demonstration, gone on strike, or written in social media on rights in the last 
12 months; self-identification with the political spectrum; how important it is to vote; how 
important it is to participate in social organizations; average level of agreement with 
sentences: each citizen should enjoy education/health/social services in proportion to 
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contributions; pessimistic view of the future of the education, health, and social security 
systems in Portugal; thinking that welfare systems are a burden to the country’s economy; 
average opinion between what should be part of a democracy: be able to give opinion, be able 
to engage in an act of social disobedience, be able to go on general strike; opinion between: 
the government should reduce taxes and social spending or the government should increase 
taxes and social spending; and opinion on unemployment benefit: those who earn more 
should get higher unemployment benefit, or those who earn less should get higher 
unemployment benefit, or everybody should get the same unemployment benefit.  
 The variables related to social rights consciousness are opinions concerning factors 
which have contributed the most to guaranteeing social rights in Portugal; the frequency with 
which the respondent thinks or talks about welfare issues; whether, when going to a health 
centre, the respondent thinks that their taxes are funding the service, and the level of 
agreement that one can only enjoy social benefits if doing or giving something in exchange. 
Finally, socio-economic controls include: gender, age in years, level of education, household 
income, type of housing, employment status, and perceived income insecurity for the next 12 
months (scale from 1 to 4). The complete list of independent variables is presented in Table 
2.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
3.2 Models 
The modelling strategy aims to capture four different opinions, each one representing 
perspectives on universalism-targeting spectrum, based on number of rights that people 
argued should be universally guaranteed even in times of crisis: choosing one right represents 
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full targeting; choosing two represents targeting; choosing three rights represents 
universalism; and choosing all four rights represents full universalism. We created dummy 
variables for each type of response and used them as dependent variables in binary logistic 
regression models. Four binary logistic regression models were then constructed, one for each 
number of rights that people considered that should be universally guaranteed. The 
distribution of responses suggests that the sample is almost evenly split between those who 
chose a universalistic model and those who chose a contributory model. Models A and B (all 
four rights, three rights) include those who have more universalistic understandings of the 
welfare state. Together, these two models represent 48% of the sample (27.4% and 20.1%, 
respectively). In turn, models C and D reflect a more contributory understanding of welfare 
provision. Model C includes respondents who chose two rights that should be universally 
guaranteed. Model D is composed of respondents who chose only one right, which is the 
most contributory of our groups of opinion. Models C and D represent 50% of the sample 
(25.1% chose two rights, and 24.8% chose only one right4). 
 
 
                                                          
4  Only 2.6% of the sample chose no rights. 
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Discussion 
Results of the binary logistic models are provided in Table 3. 
[Table 3 here] 
Our findings partly confirm the ‘dualization’ hypothesis (H1). According to this hypothesis, 
periods of economic austerity, such as that which Portugal has experienced since 2011, are 
expected to lead to a dualization of welfare attitudes, separating ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’. 
More specifically, we expected insiders to maximize their specific contribution-based 
expectations (e.g. pensions of reform), and outsiders to maximize their need-based demands 
(e.g. minimum guaranteed income, unemployment subsidy).  
 Our findings show that those currently unemployed in Portugal do tend to prefer more 
contributory need-based social policies, such as unemployment benefit or professional 
training, rather than a universalistic model. Concretely, those who are unemployed are 52% 
less likely to choose the universalistic Model B (three rights) than those who have a job. In 
short, the unemployed in Portugal are ‘outsiders’ not only because of their objective labour 
market position but also owing to their distinctive views about how governments should 
address it. This seemingly ‘aspirational’ character of outsiderhood is one of the main findings 
of the paper. A second finding that supports H1 is the welfare attitudes of housewives and 
caretakers, another typical group of outsiders without stable employment and contributory 
careers. At first sight, our findings seem paradoxical. Housewives and caretakers were found 
to be simultaneously less and more likely to choose our two universalistic models. How to 
make sense of this? One possible interpretation brings us back to the very rationale behind 
the ‘dualization’ thesis. Like unemployed people, housewives and caretakers are 80% less 
likely to choose Model B (three rights) than those who are employed since neither group has 
contributory careers which enable them to aspire to pensions of reform or health care 
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schemes reserved for insiders. However, unlike unemployed people who have welfare 
policies specifically targeted at their condition, this group has no specially designed policy to 
look for. Hence it is not surprising that they also strongly support a universal model of 
welfare: Portuguese housewives and caretakers are 8.9 times more likely to choose Model A 
(four rights) than those who are employed. However interesting these findings are, the fact 
that we have not been able to identify similar attitudinal patterns on the part of insiders 
prevents us from fully confirming H1. 
 Our results also only partially confirm the ‘regime’ hypothesis (H2). Given the 
historical and institutional characteristics of the welfare state in Portugal, and taking into 
consideration past public opinion surveys, we expected respondents to choose the 
universalistic, all-rights option (Model A) rather than any of the other more contributory 
understandings.  
 Although almost 50% of the sample preferred universalistic models, the fact remains 
that not more than a quarter of the sample chose Model A. Several reasons may account for 
this. To begin with, this hypothesis has often proved to be difficult to test empirically. 
Previous studies have often failed or, at least, faced difficulties in using survey-based data to 
show significant differences across countries with different types of welfare regime (Jaeger, 
2006). Although our case study does reveal a significant correspondence between welfare 
attitudes and regime type, this correspondence is lower than one could expect judging from 
the de jure features of the welfare state in Portugal. If one considers its de facto profile, 
however, things look very different. In fact, a second reason for our partial confirmation of 
H2 may well be related to the fragmentation arising from the confusing coexistence in 
Portugal of universalistic solutions and clientelist and corporatist elements. This line of 
reasoning is reinforced by a third set of reasons of a circumstantial nature. The current crisis 
has accelerated the process of transformation and reform of the Mediterranean type of 
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welfare regime, raising additional doubts concerning the adequacy of the ‘regime hypothesis’ 
in tackling cases such as Portugal since the bail-out (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2013). 
In fact, it seems that there may be a growing targeted ‘Anglo-Saxon’ style of welfare, given 
that a quarter of the respondents chose to universally guarantee only one right, and around 
3% chose no rights at all. 
 Our data confirms the ‘social rights consciousness’ hypothesis (H3). Given the 
genealogy of social rights in Portugal, and the unprecedented levels of public deliberation 
over the future of the welfare state, we expected that the prevalence of ‘social rights 
consciousness’ would be positively correlated with universalistic preferences regarding social 
provision.  
 Social rights consciousness was found to determine, at least to a certain extent, 
inclusion in the universalistic Models and B. In particular, inclusion in Models A and B is 
explained by the relational and contested components of social rights consciousness. 
Believing that one can only enjoy social rights by giving or doing something in exchange is 
negatively associated with choosing Model A (each 10% agreement with the former is 
associated with 11% less likelihood of the latter). In turn, to believe that social rights exist in 
Portugal because they are guaranteed by the Constitution is associated with 80% higher 
likelihood of choosing Model B, and believing that they exist because unions have pressured 
the government is associated with twice the likelihood of choosing this same model. In short, 
a pragmatic understanding of social rights as both fundamental and absolute (as opposed to 
negotiable and conditional), and the result of concrete political struggles (as opposed to an 
idealistic understanding of rights), seems to shape individual preferences for universalistic 
models of welfare.  
 Social rights consciousness also seems to determine inclusion in the contributory 
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Models C and D, although in a different way from that of the universalistic models. 
Concretely, inclusion in Models C and D is mainly determined by the historically specific 
consciousness of the contested nature of social rights in Portugal. Whereas believing in the 
positive role of the (universalistic) Constitution of 1975 is associated with 55% less 
likelihood of choosing Model D (only one right), thinking that social rights in Portugal exist 
because they have been agreed between the government and the private sector makes one 2.6 
times more likely to choose Model C (two rights) than those who do not think this way. A 
more privatistic social rights consciousness is thus found to lie behind individual preferences 
for contributory models.  
 Underlying individual choice for more universalistic and more contributory models 
seems to be a consistent set of ways of thinking and talking about social rights. More than the 
reflective dimension of social rights consciousness, our findings suggest that it is its 
relational, and especially its contested nature, that matters. In the case of Portugal, this 
component is closely related to the political history of the democratic welfare state and the 
role that certain institutions and political actors have performed in claiming, implementing, 
and fighting for social rights. Concretely, it seems that the prioritizing of certain key social 
rights relies more upon their status as constitutional entitlements than upon fickle democratic 
political arrangements. This trumping of constitutionalism over democracy is perhaps 
associated with both popular dissatisfaction with party politics, confirmed by successive 
opinion polls in recent years, and the positive association in the public mind between the 
Portuguese Constitution and the universalistic protection of social welfare benefits and 
entitlements. Our findings give credence to this line of reasoning. Inclusion in the fully 
universalistic Model A is determined by a rejection of representative democracy and the party 
system (each 10% increase in agreeing that voting is important is associated with 10% less 
probability of choosing this model), and a concomitant endorsement of more horizontal and 
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informal forms of political participation (each 10% increase in thinking that it is important to 
take part in social organizations is associated with an 18% increase in the latter). Informing 
choice between universal and contributory models of public social provision one finds certain 
ways of thinking and acting towards rights, which, in turn, seem closely related to ideas about 
political history and agency, as well as to concrete forms of political participation.  
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Conclusion 
In this article we have examined how social attitudes towards the welfare state fare under 
conditions of economic austerity. It utilizes original data from a customized survey conducted 
in Portugal in spring 2013, approximately two years after the country benefited from a €78 
billion bail-out on condition that Lisbon made extensive cuts to public expenditure, including 
social welfare provision. After several decades of welfare state expansion, involving the 
enactment of popular policies within a broad political consensus, this was the first time the 
Portuguese authorities needed to enact the unpopular ‘new politics of welfare retrenchment’ 
(Pierson 1996) in a context marked by the troika’s external intervention, substantial political 
mobilization, and vocal opposition to welfare retrenchment by established interest groups, 
opposition political parties, and the Constitutional Court. This article provides the first 
systematic analysis of social welfare attitudes in Portugal under these new conditions. 
Besides using original data to tackle a relevant topic, the article introduces an original 
approach into a well researched field. In particular, we have (a) tested some of the most 
important hypotheses in the literature, and (b) devised and tested a hypothesis of our own.  
 First, we have shown that Portugal is an increasingly dualized society, and that the 
Portuguese tend to think of welfare provision along the lines of this new cleavage. In 
particular, outsiderness emerges from our study as a category whose salience is as much 
related to one’s job market performance, as it is to the possibility of aspiring to concrete 
social policies. This finding can contribute to correct the underlying materialism of some of 
the ‘dualization’ scholarship, which sees insiderness and outsiderness as individual attributes 
arising from specific labour market careers, rather than as floating signifiers in which we all 
potentially fit at one point or another. From this angle, insiderness is a system of 
classification not unlike those of age, gender, race, or class, with which it intersects in 
individual biographies and collective experiences. Future studies should explore this finding, 
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both longitudinally (e.g. before and after the crisis), and cross-nationally (e.g. to identify 
possible common patterns among Southern European countries). In addition, qualitative 
studies should be used to analyse the dualization of European societies in more detail. For 
instance, it would be useful to shed light on the processes through which social agents 
become ‘outsiders’ or ‘insiders’ in different periods of their lives as a result of certain life 
choices or eventualities, and how this intersects with their gender, ethnicity, and class 
position.  
 Another hypothesis in the literature tested here was the ‘regime’ hypothesis. Our 
results show that there is a significant and substantial correspondence between the type of 
welfare regime in Portugal and social welfare attitudes. This was not enough, however, to 
fully confirm this hypothesis and we adduced several reasons why this may be the case, 
including the well known gap between the impact of macro-level institutional arrangements 
and micro-level survey data.  
 In the third hypothesis, we explored a possible solution to this difficulty in the form of 
the pragmatic concept of ‘social rights consciousness’. Although an individual-level variable, 
social rights consciousness is aimed at capturing the practical knowledge of respondents, 
which is not reduced to individual preferences. Also, by focusing upon inherently creative 
ways of doing and thinking, it exceeds the impact of macro-structural factors. Incidentally, 
this was the only hypothesis confirmed by our data. In Portugal in 2013, the more conscious 
one is of the contested nature of social rights, the more likely one is to reject contributory 
understandings of welfare and to endorse universalistic ones. This is one of the chief 
contributions of this paper. Whilst ‘legal consciousness’ has long been used in qualitative and 
quantitative studies, especially in the United States, its inclusion in the literature of European 
welfare politics, mainly focused either upon individual socio-economic characteristics or 
institutional variables, is still limited. Although circumscribed to one country and a single 
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year, our results suggest that this neo-Meadian variable be included in future comparative and 
longitudinal studies of welfare attitudes. 
 In sum, in this paper we have presented an overview of the social attitudes of the 
Portuguese towards the welfare state at a time when they were confronted with a hard choice. 
The title of the paper takes its inspiration from William Styron’s 1979 novel Sophie’s Choice 
about a woman offered the choice by a Nazi concentration camp officer of saving the life of 
one of her two children at the expense of the other. Whilst less extreme than Sophie’s choice, 
the choice the Portuguese faced in 2013 was nevertheless painful and equally imposed by an 
external party. This choice was that of a new politics of welfare retrenchment or bankruptcy. 
For the purposes of this paper, we reformulated this choice in terms of which social rights 
people believe should be protected from welfare retrenchment. The Portuguese choice, our 
findings suggest, has been shaped in part by individual labour market performance, in part by 
a historical-institutional orientation towards universalism, and to a significant extent, by 
social rights consciousness. Only time will tell if their decision will prove as difficult to live 
with as Sophie’s choice.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Characteristic  % 
Gender Male 
Female 
45.8% 
54.1% 
Age 18 to 24 years 
25 to 34 years 
35 to 44 years 
45 to 54 years 
55 to 64 years 
65 years or more 
9.3% 
16.7% 
17.7% 
18.3% 
15.5% 
22.5% 
Employment status Employed 
Unemployed  
Pensioner 
At home / student 
Other 
42.6% 
18.9% 
28.1% 
9.0% 
1.4% 
Level of education Completed primary school 
Completed up to secondary school 
Completed high school 
Completed general or technologic studies 
Completed some technical specialisation 
Completed higher education 
9.4% 
26% 
14% 
28.2% 
13.4% 
9% 
Type of housing Own and paid for 
Own and paying the credit 
Rented (pre-1990 scheme) 
Rented (post-1990 scheme) 
Other 
34.8% 
24.2% 
11.1% 
23.8% 
6% 
Source: Original survey. Sample size: 1,258 adults in Continental Portugal. 
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Table 2. Independent variables used in the regression models 
 
Domain  Values 
Political 
participation  
Whether the respondent has either contacted 
a politician, worked in a party, signed a 
petition, participated in a demonstration, 
gone on strike, or written in social media on 
rights in the last 12 months. 
Yes/No indicating whether respondent 
has done either of these actions. 
 Self-identification in the political spectrum. Left/Centre/Right. 
 How important it is to vote. Continuous values from 1 (total 
disagreement) to 7 (total agreement). 
 How important it is to engage in social 
organisations. 
Continuous values from 1 (total 
disagreement) to 7 (total agreement). 
Welfare 
ideology 
Level of agreement with the phrases: “each 
citizen should enjoy education in proportion 
to contribution; each citizen should enjoy 
health services in proportion to contribution; 
each citizen should enjoy social security in 
proportion to contribution”. 
Each question could take values from (1 
total disagreement) to 7 (total 
agreement).  New variable was created 
to compute the average of the three. 
 Whether (1) the education system (2) health 
services (3) social security in Portugal will 
not be able to be maintained, will be 
maintained, or be improved.  
New “pessimism” variable was created: 
if respondent thought the three systems 
will not be able to be maintained. 
 Level of agreement: welfare systems are a 
burden to the country´s economy. 
Continuous values from 1 (total 
disagreement) to 7 (total agreement). 
 How important it is for a democracy: to be 
able to give opinion, to be able to engage in 
social disobedience act, to be able to go on 
general strike.  
Each question could take values from (1 
total disagreement) to 7 (total 
agreement).  New variable was created 
to compute the average of the three. 
 Preference between lower taxes and lower 
social spending, or higher taxes and higher 
spending. 
Continuous values from 0 (reduce taxes 
and social spending) and 10 (increase 
taxes and social spending). 
 Opinion on unemployment benefit. Four options: those who earn more 
should get higher unemployment benefit, 
or those who earn less should get higher 
unemployment benefit, everybody 
should get the same unemployment 
benefit, other arrangement. 
Social rights 
consciousness 
How often “do you think or talk about 
welfare issues such as education, health, 
pensions”. 
Three options: never, sometimes, often. 
 How often “do you follow the news on 
welfare issues such as education, health, 
pensions”. 
Three options: never, sometimes, often. 
 “When going to a health centre, do you think 
that your taxes are funding the service”. 
Two options: Yes/ no. 
 Level of agreement: “One can only enjoy 
social benefits if doing or giving something 
Continuous values from 1 (total 
disagreement) to 7 (total agreement). 
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in exchange”. 
 Social rights exist because:  
 They are found in the Portuguese 
Constitution. 
 
Two options: Yes/ no. 
  Workers fought for them. Two options: Yes/ no. 
  Portugal is a Democracy. Two options: Yes/ no. 
  There is pressure from the unions. Two options: Yes/ no. 
  A pact between the government, private 
sector, and unions. 
Two options: Yes/ no. 
  Portugal joined the European Union. Two options: Yes/ no. 
Socio-economic 
controls 
Gender. Male/female 
 Age. Continuous, in years. 
 Level of education. Up to primary school. 
Completed up to secondary school. 
Completed high school. 
Completed general or technologic 
studies. 
Completed some technical 
specialisation. 
Completed higher education. 
 Household income Continuous OECD equivalised total 
household income. 
 Type of housing Own and paid for. 
Own and paying the credit. 
Rented (pre-1990 scheme). 
Rented (post-1990 scheme). 
Other. 
 Employment status  Employed. 
Unemployed. 
Pensioner. 
At home / student. 
Other. 
 Perceived income insecurity: consider 
income will be sufficient in this year 
Yes/no. 
Source: Original survey. Sample size: 1,258 adults in Continental Portugal. 
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Table 3. Binary logistic regression models 
 
 
Model A.  
choosing four rights     
R2: .219 
Model B. 
choosing three 
rights.  R2: .168 
Model C. 
choosing two 
rights.  R2: .221 
Model D. choosing 
only one right. R2: 
.220 
 Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. 
 Political participation (contacted politician etc) 1.233 .410 .767 .336 1.038 .883 1.043 .866 
Political self-definition: category: centre  .323  .331  .053  .791 
Left  1.175 .510 1.275 .342 .545   .016* 1.113 .659 
Right  1.571 .137 .736 .388 .763 .386 .882 .706 
Important to vote .841  .027* 1.163 .099 1.079 .339 .992 .917 
Important to participate in social organisations 1.262    .006** .849 .055 1.013 .867 .902 .188 
Enjoy rights based on contribution 1.078 .576 .899 .447 .700    .008** 1.447    .008** 
Pessimistic about future of welfare .734 .175 .752 .231 1.115 .623 1.878    .005** 
Welfare is burden on the economy 1.167  .034* .984 .830 .906 .160 .941 .393 
Actions for democracy 1.078 .650 1.129 .481 .798 .146 .982 .911 
Less taxes and less welfare versus more taxes 
and more welfare 1.082 .064 1.079 .094 .854    .000** 1.015 .717 
Pay more: higher unemployment benefit  .169  .520  .197  .205 
Equal unemployment benefit .937 .789 1.028 .909 .607   .037* 1.324 .237 
Pay less: higher unemployment benefit 1.041 .915 .597 .254 .658 .331 2.022 .058 
Other unemployment scheme 2.736  .035* .565 .346 .728 .511 .784 .660 
Think or talk about welfare: reference: never  .770  .294  .163  .073 
Think or talk: always 1.110 .724 1.552 .153 .754 .338 .745 .349 
Think or talk: sometimes .921 .764 1.112 .719 .596 .058 1.362 .260 
Frequency follows news .920 .719 .940 .802 1.161 .526 .926 .739 
When going to health centre, think of welfare and 
taxes 1.486 .115 .957 .863 .679 .107 1.237 .400 
Need to do or give something in exchange .880  .042* 1.030 .664 1.103 .117 .980 .758 
Social rights exist because:         
    They are in the Portuguese Constitution 1.363 .160 1.766   .016* .944 .793 .454    .000** 
    Workers fought for them .854 .468 1.142 .565 1.455 .089 .632   .040* 
    Portugal is a democracy  1.511 .063 .914 .701 .877 .563 .844 .454 
    Pressure from unions .851 .626 2.015   .030* .627 .178 .883 .715 
    Pact between government, private sector, and 
unions .344   .004** .367   .016* 2.567    .001** 1.472 .185 
    Portugal joined the European Union .389  .043* 1.254 .564 1.149 .711 1.197 .605 
Gender: male 1.213 .390 1.124 .614 1.039 .864 .720 .141 
Age .968   .004** 1.016 .196 1.011 .319 1.023   .049* 
Education: reference: up to primary  .272  .053  .810    .019* 
Education: basic 1 1.447 .407 2.051 .137 1.252 .657 .381   .019* 
Education: basic 2 2.996  .035* .791 .687 1.739 .332 .348 .034 
Technical education 2.491 .080 1.301 .638 1.825 .283 .192    .001** 
Specialization  2.632 .107 .845 .791 2.201 .205 .214    .009** 
Graduate education 1.868 .339 .507 .328 2.067 .259 .438 .161 
Household income 1.038 .689 .983 .866 1.040 .689 .933 .479 
House: reference: owned and paid for   .027*  .413    .046*  .097 
House: owned and paying .994 .985 1.222 .534 1.436 .222 .594 .083 
House: controlled rent 2.593   .007** 1.746 .140 .326   .024* .425   .032* 
 House: free market rent 1.326 .367 1.247 .505 1.216 .527 .540 .050 
 House: other  .443 .209 2.332 .108 .691 .503 1.040 .936 
 Employment: reference: employed   .042*    .039*  .307  .440 
 Unemployed 1.153 .649 .481   .026* 1.060 .851 1.590 .117 
 Pensioner  .863 .686 .815 .605 1.638 .214 1.161 .701 
 Domestic / student 2.051 .079 .221   .010* 1.819 .138 .755 .518 
 Other  8.888   .011** .379 .424 .254 .240 .821 .866 
 Feels economically insecure 1.494   .002** .941 .656 .939 .648 .803 .103 
 Constant 7.000 .008 .000 .163 .000 .343 .000 .057 
 Source: original survey in continental Portugal in spring 2013.  Sample size: 1,258. 
Exp(B): Odds ratio of responding in such way (the dependent variable). For example: in Model A, those who think that it is important to 
participate in social organisations are 26% more likely to choose the four rights than those who do not think that way.  Also, those who 
think that social rights exist thanks to a pact between the government, the private sector, and unions are 66% less likely to choose the 
four rights than those who do not. 
  * significant at .05 level      ** significant at .01 level. 
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